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THE DISPUTES ARTICLE IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
Leslie L. Anderson*

N APPROACH to the subject of government contracts requires
some departure from the lawer's usual concept of a legal right.
In this field, departures from generally accepted principles of contract
law have developed in no small part from administrative practice, and
the concept of a legal right cannot be thought of simply from the
angle of enforceability in court. In transactions between private parties,
the fact thc1;t the United States Supreme Court in Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson1 recently treated a legal right as being in essence
merely dormant after the running 6f the statute of limitations against
it would be meaningless if it had not declared also that a statute passed
later could revive the right to sue. It happens that claims against the
United States, however valid they might be under the law of private
contracts, can never be the subject of a lawsuit except to the extent that
Congress consents.2 Until the establishment of the United States Court
of Claims in I 855, Congress had denied suit against the government
generally on contract claims. Even now, where suit against the government is permitted, the judgment creditor's claim will not permit of a
levy of execution for its enforcement. Having consented that the gov-

A

* B.A., M.A. University of Minnesota, LL.B. Harvard. Member of the (Minneapolis) Minnesota bar. Captain, J.A.G.D. Member of the faculty of The, Judge
Advocate General's School, Ann Arbor, Michigan. This article presents the personal
analysis of the author. Its views are not to be understood as representing the official
position of any War Department agency or of any other person within the War
Department.-Ed.
1
· 65 S.Ct. II37 (1945), petition for rehearing denied, 65 S.Ct. 1561 (1945).
2
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1934). This immunity
from suit may be extended by Congress to a corporation owned wholly by the United
States. Maricopa County v. Valley National Bank of Phoenix, 318 U.S. 357, 63 S.Ct.
587 (1943). In The Siren, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 152 (1868), Mr. Justice Field said
(on p. 154) that "the same exemption from judicial process extends to the property
of the United States, and for the same reason." See also United States v. Alabama,
313 U.S. 274, 61 S.Ct. lOII (1941), in which the state attempted to foreclose a tax
lien against real estate owned by the federal government; Minnesota v. United States,
305 U.S. 382, 59 S.Ct. 292 (1939), in which the state attempted to condemn land
for a right-of-way over lands held by the United States in trust for Indians; and
Stitzell Weller Distillery v. Wallace, (D.C.D.C. 1940) 30 F. Supp. 1010, in which
an attempt was made to proceed against a fund in which the United States claimed
some interest.
For a general discussion, see Grismore, "Contracts with the United States," · 22
M1cH. L. REv. 749 (1924).
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ernment be sued in any case or class of cases, Congress may choose not
to pay the claim after it is reduced to judgment, or may let the judgment creditor wait until Congress has taken all the time it wants before
it provides for payment. Nevertheless, usage justifies the claimant's
saying in the field of government contracts that he has a right, one supported by legal rules on which the federal courts do act whenever
litigation against the government is properly before them.

Methods of Determining Government Contract Claims
Some of the principal distinctions between the law of government
contracts and that of private contracts arise out of the methods by which
disposal is made of claims in each field. If there is no other method of
recovery, relief under a government contract may always be sought in
Congress, even in cases where the claim is stale. As compared to judicial relief, awarded upon the basis of legal principles, the results may
be more dependent upon non-legal consideration. Mention of approaching Congress for relief sounds as if the outcome might be determined
pretty mµch by the daimant's favor with his Congressman, but persons
in private business, upon whom the conduct of government is dependent in no small part, regard the right generally as a judicially-determinable· claim which is not dependent upon favoritism for its adjudication. Moreover, from the government's own position, the task of paying claims against the government is so substantial that a busy Congress
has had to delegate to other agencies the power to consider many claims
and to allow them if proper; and courts have had to be given some
authority to determine them.
By the Budget and Accounting Act of I 92 I 8 Congress provided in
general terms that claims by and against the United States shall be
"settled and adjusted" within the General Accounting Office, and that
that office be "independent of the executive departments and under the
control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States."
The Comptroller General and Assistant Comptroller General were to
take the place and assume the functions generally of the Comptroller
of the Treasury and his six auditors whose offices were abolished by
the I 92 I act.4 When the General Accounting Office and the contractor
are in accord, resort to the courts becomes unnecessary. The power of
the General Accounting Office to adjust claims includes the power to
Act of June IO, 1921, c. 18, 42 Stat. L. 20-26, 31 U.S.C. (1940), §§ 41-71.
42 Stat. L. 20-26 (1921), 31 U.S.C. (1940), §§ 41-71. Provision for the
· Comptroller of the Treasury was made in the Act of Sept. 2, 1789, 5 U.S.C. (1940),
§ 241, which established the Treasu.ry- Department.
·
8

4
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accomplish administratively what a court could do by way of giving
equitable relief if the contractor had sued.5 When the General Accounting Office and the contractor are not in accord, the contractor still may
sue to the extent that Congress has permitted suit against the government. Nor is going to the General Accounting Office a condition precedent to the contractor's bringing suit. If he so desires, he may disregard
that office entirely and commence action. However, in the interests of
economy and more rapid settlement of claims, it was clearly the intention of Congress that insofar as the General Accounting Office can adjust claims satisfactorily it should do so and the courts should be spared
unnecessary litigation before them.
In more specific terms, Congress has provided a judicial method
for the determination of contract rights. Under a series of similar
statutes, referred to as the Tucker Act since it was enacted in that form
in 1887, Congress has permitted the United States to be sued in the
Court of Claims in any amount and in the United States district
courts in an amount not in excess of $ ro,ooo in actions based "upon
any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the United
States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding
.m tort ...."6
A still further method for the settlement of di:fferences between the
government and the contractor has been adopted within the executive
departments on their own initiative and without the aid of specific legislation. They have provided for insertion into government contracts
of what is known as a "disputes" article, setting forth, in short, that if
certain disputes arise under the contract they will be disposed of by
some administrative officer of the government's choosing. This administrative procedure has been used over a considerable period of time and
appears, at least, never to have been frowned upon by Congress.

Provisions of Disputes Articles
The following is an extract from a standard "disputes" article:
"Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, all
disputes concerning questions of fact which may arise under this
5

By mutual oversight, a certain clause was omitted from a written government contract. The Comptroller General ruled that, in making the final settlement of sums due
under the contract, the General Accounting Office might authorize adjustments made
necessary by the mistake which would accomplish the same result as if a court had
decreed a reformation of the instrument. 17 Comp. Gen. 452 (1937).
6
36 Stat. L. u36 (19u), 28 U.S.C. (1940), § 250; and 36 Stat. L. 1093
(19u), 28 U.S.C. (1940), § 41 (20).
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contract, and which are not disposed of by mutual agreement, shall
be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce. his decision to writing and mail a copy thereof to the Contractor at his
address shown herein. Within 30 days from said mailing the Contractor may appeal in writing to the Secretary of War, whose written decision or that of his designated representative or representatives thereon shall be final and conclusive upon the parties hereto .
• . . Pending decision of a dispute hereunder the Contractor shall
diligently proceed with the performance of this contract...."
It wiU be observed that this article refers only to questions of fact.
Some government contract -"disputes" articles contain broad language
that covers all disputes,1 leaving room for the possible construction
that all questions, whether of fact or law or mixed questions of law and
fact, are to be determined by the designated administrative officer.
Sometimes labor issues are excepted from the provisions of the broad
article and left for determination by the head of the executive department involved. 8 Even though the narrow article quoted above may
be used in the contract, specifications of the work to be done often also
contain a "disputes, protests and appeals" article 9 which purports to
give the contracting officer ~nd appellate body power to decide certain
types of disputes irrespective of whether they be of law or of fact. The
standard article shown above makes the decision of the head of the
executive department on appeal final and conclusive. If does not say
specifically that the decision of the contracting officer will be final in
the event the contractor makes no timely appeal, but it is construed to
1

Such an article reads in part, "All disputes concerning questions arising under
this contract shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, etc."
8 A typical provision concerning labor disputes reads, "All labor issues arising
under this contract which cannot be satisfactorily adjusted by the Contracting Officer
shall be· submitted to the Head of the Department."
9 Reading: "If the Contractor copsiders any work demanded of him to be outside
the requirements of the contract or if he considers any action or ruling of the Contracting Officer or of the inspectors to be unfair, the Contractor shall without undue
delay, upon such demand, action, or ruling, submit his protest thereto in writing to
, the Contracting Officer, stating clearly and in detail the basis of his objections. The
Contracting Officer shall thereupon promptly investigate the complaint and furnish the
Contractor his decision in writing, thereon. If the Contractor is not satisfied with
the decision of the Contracting Officer, he may, within thirty days, appeal in writing
to the Secretary of War, whose decision or that of his duly authorized representative
shall be final and binding upon the parties to the contract. Except for such protests
or objections as are made of record in the manner herein specified and within the
time limit stated, the records, rulings, instructions or decisions of the Contracting
Officer shall be final and conclusive. • • ."
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mean that it will be.10 It is not infrequent to provide in the specifications accompanying the contract that certain types of determinations by
the contracting officer shall be final without any right of appeal.11 The
extent to which administrative officers may determine finally questions
of law under government contracts is discussed later in this article.

Problem of Narrowing Judicial Review by Contract
The rule has long been established in private contract law that
parties to a contract may agree in advance to be bound by the decision
of some person other than the courts in the event that disputes arise.12
The same rule has-been carried over to government contract law,18 so
that the decision may be made by some government agent. Even
though the administrative settlement provisions of the «disputes" article are not the product of any specific statute, it is established that the
decision of the administrative officer designated in the government contract is binding, not only on the parties, but on the courts and on the
General Accounti~g Office,14 even despite a mistake on the part of the

°Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878); Comb Co. v. United States,
100 Ct. CI. 259 (1943); Hirsch Shirt Corp., B.C.A. No. 429, January 21, 1944.
The words that the decision "shall prevail," are synonymous with "shall be final and
conclusive.'' Dayton Airplane Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 6th, 1927) 21 F. (2d)
1

673.
11
Specifications showing the work for which the contract was made sometimes
contain the following clause: "The decision of the contracting officer or his authorized
representative as to the proper interpretation of the drawings and specifications shall
be final." Where· the contract provides that the contracting officer shall interpret the
drawings and specifications, but does not say that his interpretation is final, it will not
be treated as final and the contractor will be able to appeal under at least the broad
"disputes" article which does not limit appeals to questions of fact. Comb Co. v. United
States, 100 Ct. CI. 259 (1943).
12
Martinsburg and Potomac Railroad Co. v. March, 114 U.S. 549, 5 S.Ct. 1035
(1885); Chicago, Santa Fe and California Railroad Co. v. Price, 138 U. S. 185, II
S. Ct. 290 (1891).
18
United States v. Gleason, 175 U.S. 588, 20 S. Ct. 228 (1900); United States
v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S. 323, 43 S. Ct. 128 (1922).
14
Mr. Justice McKenna said in United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S.
323 at 326, 43 S. Ct. 128 (1922), " .•• the parties can so provide and ••• the deci.'.
sion of the officer is conclusive upon the parties. [ Citation of cases.] .•. This is extending the rule between private parties to the Government. There were such decisions •.•• ·Over the effect of these the Comptroller of the Treasury has no power."
Goltra v. Weeks, 271. U.S. 536, 46 S. Ct. 613 (1926); Saalfield v. United States,
246 U.S. 610, 38 S. Ct. 397 (1918); Comb Co. v. United States, 100 Ct. CI. 259
(1943); Lyons v. United States, 98 Ct. CI. 533 (1943); Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.
v. United Stat.es, 58 Ct. CI. 633 (1923).
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administrative o:fficer,15 in the absence of arbitrariness, captmousness,
fraud or bad faith on his part.
So far as disputes outside the provisions of the "disputes" article are
concerned, the contractor still may press his claim within the General
Accounting Office or in the courts. In borderline cases, he may resort
to the court only to find there that the decision should have been
made under the "disputes" article within the executive department con- .
cerned and be informed to his sorrow and financial embarrassment that
it is too late to appeal in accord with the procedural provisions within
the contract. In order to save his remedy, therefore, it may be advisable
to appeal_ under the administrative provisions of the contract in the
case of all disputes and sue in court only when that procedure fails for
want of jurisdiction.16 If the contractor elects to resort to the courts for
relief, the courts may not of their own accord require the claimant to
show that he has pursued his remedy within the government department without success, where the contract itself does not require such
procedure. The Supreme Court has said that the jurisdiction of the
courts is established by the Tucker Act, and further jurisdictional re-.
strictions may be imposed only by Congress. 11 Without specific legislation directing it to do so, then, the contracting agencies of the govern- ment may limit the extent of judicial review in at least some degree
by agreement with the contractor, but the courts may not impose their
own limitations upon such review. How far it is possible to limit resort
to the courts by agreement is a problem of considerable controversy dis15 In Needles v. United States, IOI Ct. Cl. 535 (1944) (holding the decision
of the contracting officer to be so grossly erroneous under the terms of the contract as
to imply bad faith),- Judge Littleton defined arbitrariness and bad faith (at pp. 602606): " ••• no question of personal animosity or calculated bias, prejudice, or actual
dishonesty is necessarily involved in an ultimate finding of implied bad faith. . . • A
decision or finding may be held to be arbitrary when existirlg important facts, conditions, and express contract provisions should obviously have been considered and given
due and proper weight, but were not. . . . bad faith in, a legal sense could be inferred
from the grossly erroneous character of the decision itself..•• The fact that the decision was very erroneous ••• is not sufficient to justify its being overturned if the officer
appears to have known or considered fairly the facts and circumstances..•." (Mistake,
but no fraud or gross mistake) Kennedy v. United States, 24 Ct. Cl. 122 (1889).
(Mistake by arbitrators) Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 344 (1854).
16 This procedure is recommended in C.C.H. WAR LAW SERVICE, Govt. Contracts, 1f II 8 I. The mere fact that the contractor did not appeal on time because of
his own confusion as to whether questions of law or fact were involved was felt not to
show "good cause" for hearing a late appeal by the War Department Board of Contract Appeals. Corson and Gruman Company, B.C.A. No. 316, September 21, 1943.
17 Clyde v. United States, 13 Wall. (So U.S.) 38 (1871); Plato v. United States,
86 Ct. Cl. 665 (1938).
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cussed to some extent herein and perhaps answerable in part by visualizing the nature of the administrative procedure for which the "disputes" article provides.

Disputes Article Method and Arbitration
The courts themselves, on occasions, have referred to administrative
officers, such as those provided for in the article, as "arbitrators" 18 and
to their decisions as "awards," 19 the latter being arbitration language.
Having used such language, they explained subsequently that such officers are not arbitrators in the true sense and that there are some differences between arbitration and this administrative method of settling
controversies. 20 It is true that both methods are pursued in accord with
an agreement between the parties. It has become not unusual, too, to
refer to almost any person who helps to settle controversies, other than
a court or a statutory administrative body, as an. arbitrator. The courts
look through the language used to designate such methods, however.
Thus they recognize a distinction between persons appointed to apprais_e
property and those appointed to arbitrate a dispute concerning the property, in spite of the fact that some agreements may have called the
appraisers "arbitrators."
To help justify the position which the Comptroller General takes
toward arbitration, as will appear later in this discussion, it may be
well to emphasize that appraisers act on the basis of their own specialized knowledge in making evaluations outside of what they may learn
at any hearing, and ordinarily they are not required to receive evidence
from the parties and their opinions are not final. 21 The administrative
officers specified in the "disputes" article of a government -contract
actually make determinative rulings and always act as agents of the
government in doing so. Their duties are purely ministerial, as distinguished from judicial, for they do not purport to be impartial judges.22
18 DeGroot v. United States, 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 419 (1866); ("arbiter") The
Penker Construction Company v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. l (1942); Lower Baraboo
River Drainage District v. Schirmer, 199 Wis. 230, 225 N.W. 331 (1929).
19 Towar Cotton Mills, Inc. v. United States, 270 U. S. 375, 46 S. Ct. 211
(1926).
20
Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 188 (1868). See Nutt v. United
States, 125 U.S. 650, 8 S. Ct. 997 (1888).
21 City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 30 S. Ct. 615 (1910);
Jefferson Fire Insurance Co. v. Bierce & Sage, (C. C. Mich. 1910) 183 F. 588;
Officer v. American Eagle Fire Insurance Co., 175 La. 581, 143 S. 500 (1932). See
6 WILLISTON ON CoNTRACTS, Rev. ed., Williston and Thompson, §§ 1918 and 1921A
( 1938).
22 Silas Mason Co. Inc. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 266 (1940). -
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Arbitrators are usually chosen by some method agreed upon by the parties, but their status is semijudicial and they are to act impartially.
Often their appointment is pursuant to a rule of court, but the extent
of their authority is still limited by the agreement of the parties to the
contract. 28 The effort is to divorce such arbitrators from any blemish
of party representation irrespective of who may have chosen them or
will pay for their services. While the agreement defines the extent of
their functions, the usual purpose of arbitration is to accomplish substantial justice between the parties by a simple and inexpensive hearing.
Arbitrators are judges of the parties' own choosing. In their effort to
bring about an equitable result, they are expected to disregard the law
at times, even as it is generally understood in advance that they are not
apt to be persons learned in the law. The prevailing view among state
courts· is that arbitration awards are conclusive upon the parties as to
questions of law as well as to questions of fact. 24
However, when the government is a party, arbitration may not
ordinarily be employed. The Comptro,ller General, in so ruling, points,
not 011,ly to the provisions bf the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
which provides that claims by and against the government shall be
settled and adjusted within the General Accounting Office, but also to
statutes which prohibit payment by the government of the expenses of
any commission, council, board or other similar -body that might be
appointed to determine matters arising under contracts, except as such
payments have been authorized by law. 25
In the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, Congress has made specific
provision for arbitration in the field of termination of war contracts. 26
23
Johnson v. Noble, 13 N.H. 286 (1842); Cook v. Carpenter & Cook, 34 Vt.
121 (1861).
24
In re Curtis and Castle Arbitration, 64 Conn. 501, 30 A. 769 (1894); Modem System Bakery v. Salisbury, 215 Ky. 230, 284 S.W. 994 (1926); Roberts Bros.·
v. Consumers Can Company, 102 Md. 362, 62 A. 585 (1905); Brush v. Fisher, 70
Mich. 469, 38 N.W. 446 (1888); Goddard v. King, 40 Minn. 164, 41 N.W. 659
(1889); Park Construction Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 32, 216 Minn. 27,
11 N.W. (2d) 649 (1943); Pierson v. Hobbes, 33 N.H. 27 (1856); Wheat Export
Co. Inc. v. New Century Co., 185 App. Div. 723, 173 N.Y.S. 679 (1919) (affirmed
in 227 N.Y. 595, 125 N.E. 926); Jacob v. Pacific Export Lumber Co., 136 Ore. 622,
297 P. 848 (1931); Hollingsworth v. ~iper, I Dallas (Pa.) 161 (1786); Jocelyn
v. Donnel, Peck (Tenn.) 274 (1823); Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582 (1859); Boomer
Coal & Coke Co. ~- Osenton, 101 W. Va. 683, 133 S.E. 381 (1926); McCord v.
Flynn, 111 Wis. 78;.86 N.W. 668. (1901). See note in 112 4.L.R. 873 (1938).
25 7 Comp. Gen. 541 (1928); 19 Comp. Gen. 700 (1940). See U. S. Rev.
Stat., tit. 41, § 3681-(1878), 31 U.S.C. (1940), § 672, and 35 Stat. L. 1027, § 9
(1909), 31 u.s.c. (1940), § 673.
·
26 !?. 1718, July 1, 1944 (Public No. 395), 41 U.S.C. (1940), Supp. IV, § 101.
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The legal basis for settlement of controversies under the "disputes"
article is well established, notwithstanding anything the Comptroller
General may decide about arbitration. 27 He did sanction a proposed
lease of a restaurant concession at Washington National Airport
which provided for a five year rental at a specified price with an option
on the part of the lessee to renew the lease for another five years at
rent not less than the government would receive during the first five
years, but at a figure to be determined by three "arbitrators." He
pointed out that the arbitrators under the lease were unable to impose
any additional burden on the government, would only be able to add
to the government income, and were not to determine any questions
of law. 28 The Comptroller General has also upheld the appointment of
"arbitrators" to give their opinion as to the reasonable value of emergency plant facilities, their-function being much like that of appraisers
and not true arbitrators. 29
Mr. Justice Story once said that reliance upon arbitration as a
method of settling controversies might interfere with the administration of justice, and suggested that executory agreements to arbitrate
should not be specifically enforced.30 The Supreme Court thereafter
indicated that arbitration between private parties conflicted with Article
III, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases
in law and equity arising under the Constitution and the laws of the
United States.81 Yet federal courts have not been hostile to arbitration
awards, once made, insofar as they have been limited to the determination of questions of fact upon which legal actions might be based, or
where there might be submitted to "a supervising umpire or technical
27 Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878); · Sweeney v. United States,
109 U.S. 618, 3 S. Ct. 344 (1883); United States v. Gleason, 175 U.S. 588, 20
S. Ct. 228 (1900); Plumley v. United States, 226 U.S. 545, 33 S. Ct. 139 (1913);
Merrill-Ruckgaber Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 387, 36 S. Ct. 662 (1916); United
States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U. S. 323, 43 S. Ct. 128 (1922); Goltra v.
Weeks, 271 U. S. 536, 46 S. Ct. 613 (1926); United States v. McShain, Inc., 308
U.S. 512, 60 S. Ct. 134 (1939); United States v. Callahan Walker Co., 317 U. S.
56, 63 S. Ct. II3 (1942); United States v. Blair, 321 U. S. 730, 64 S. Ct. 820
(1944).
.
28
22 Comp. Gen. 140 (1942).
29
20 Comp. Gen. 95 (1940). On the other hand, the Attorney General ruled
that it was bad to sell government property at a price to be fixed by arbitrators. 33
Op. Atty. Gen. 160 (1922).
so STORY, COMMENTARIES oN EQUITY, § 670 (1836). To the same effect, see
The Excelsior, 123 U. S. 40, 8 S. Ct. 33 (1887); Munson v. Straits of Dover S. S.
Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1900) 99 F. 787, affirmed in (C.C.A. 2d, 1900) 100 F. 1005.
81 Insurance Company v. Morse, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 445 (1874).
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expert or one man who is both, questions of fact arising under his supervision or pertaining to his specialty, and such questions of construction
of law as are incidental to the controversy which may arise upon the
subject." 82 We have yet to learn whether the United States Supreme
Court would go as far today as various of the state courts have gone in
permitting arbitrators to make final determination of questions of law.
Some federal courts have said that the decision of arbitrators as to questions of both law and fact may be final. 88 The similarities between arbitration and the administrative method provided by the "disputes" articl~ are so substantial that, on principle, the law covering both ought to
be the same generally on this subject except as statutes or the language
of agreements may compel a di:fferent conclusion.
.
Congress has expressed its favor of the arbitration method in The
United States Arbitration Act by making executory private agreements
to .arbitrate specifically enforceable.84 A number of states have passed
somewhat similar statutes.85 There has been some agitation for legislation approving the arbitration method for settling disputes under government contracts.86 Congress, it is argued, is denying to the govern32

Jefferson Fire Insurance Co. v. Bierce & Sage, (C.C. Mich. 1910) 183 F. 588

at 590.
33

The Hartbridge, (C.C.A. 2d, 1932) 62 F. (2d) 72; Richardson & Sons, Limited
Hedger Transportation Corp., (C.C.A. 2d~ 1938) 98 F. (2d) 55, writ of
certiorari denied, 305 U.S. 657, 59 S. Ct. 360 (1939). Unless such a construction is
inevitable, arbitration agreements will not be construed to· oust the courts of jurisdiction.
American Guaranty Co. v. Caldwell, (C.C.A. 9th, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 209.
84
43 Stat. L. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C. (1940), §§ 1-13.
35
The Michigan statute reads in part: "A provision in a written contract to settle
by arbitration under this--act, a controversy thereafter arising between the parties to the
contract, with relation thereto, in which provision the method of selecting an arbitrator
or arbitrators is designated and it is agreed that a judgment of any circuit court, or other
court of competent jurisdiction, designated in such contract may be rendered upon the
award made pursuant to such agreement, shall be valid, enforceable. and irrevocable •••
Such an agreement shall stand as a submission to arbitration under this act.•••" Mich.
Comp. Laws (Mason, 1942 Supp.),§ 15394; Mich. Stat. Ann., 1943 Rev.,§ 27.2483.
The Minnesota statute on the subject, for example, however, does not deal explicitly
with specific performance. Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), §§ 9513-9519; Minn. Stat.,
1941, §§ 572.01-572.07. Mr. Justice Brandeis discussed the application of state arbitration statutes to admiralty cases in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S.
109, 44 S. Ct. 274 (1924).
86
Long note, "Arbitration and Government Contracts," 50 Yale L. J. 458
(1941); Graske, "Settlement of Government War Contract Disputes," 29 A. B. A. J.
13 (1943). Such bills were introduced in both Houses during the 2d session of the
77th Congress, S. 2350 (1942), and H. R. 7163 (1942), and again in the 1st session
of the 78th Congress, H.R. 3665 (1944). The YALE LAW JouRNAL note (at p. 470)
recommends an amendment to The United States Arbitration Act to read substantially
as follows: "Any officer of the United States, or of a department or agency thereof, au-

v:
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ment as to its own contracts the very benefits it has provided for private
parties in The United States Arbitration Act. The use of the "disputes"
article indicates a desire by the government to discourage litigation. It
is fairer to the contractor and less harsh on him to permit settlement by
arbitration rather than by the decision of some agent of the government.
Similarity to Contracts for Satisfactory Performance
On the other hand, it is doubtful that arbitration would meet sufficiently the purpose behind the "disputes" article. Perhaps the closest
category of cases to which those arising under that article could be
likened are those in whjch a service contracted for must be performed
to the satisfaction of one of the contracting parties. If he is not satisfied
with the performance, he need not accept it. Such agreements may put
the performing party at a disadvantage, but the promise of the other
party
. is real and satisfaction .is what the performing party agreed to

give.

.

In Goltra v. Weeks,81 the Chief of Engineers, in_behalf of the government, leased premises to another with the understanding· that the
chief could terminate the lease at any time "if in his judgment" the
lessee was not complying with the obligations of the contract.. The
Supreme Court held. that such a provision did not require a hearing as
thorized to enter into a written contract on behalf of the United States government or
such department or agency, may agree to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of or with respect to such contract, or to submit to arbitration any existing
controversy arising out of or with respect to such a contract. Such an agreement shall
be subject to the provisions of tj:ie United States Arbitration Act." In opposition to
such legislation, see Kronstein, "Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government," 54 YALE L. J. 36 (1944). The writer of that article is a special attorney in
the Department of Justice. That department opposed H. R. 3665, but amendments
have been proposed which may lessen substantially the extent of the department's
opposition to such a bill in the amended form. The Contracts Division of The Judge
Advocate G_eneral's Department favored the legislation, in opinion SPJGC 1943/
17373-A, March 29, 1944, signed by Colonel J. Alton Hosch.
87 271 U.S. 536, 46 S. Ct. 613 (1926). In cases of a contract for performance
by one party to the satisfaction of the other, the latter's determination must ·be reasonable unless the contract clearly _shows that it need not be. CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT,
§ 265 (1932); Barnett v. Beggs, (C.C.A. 8th, 1913) 208 F. 255; Adamson v. Milburn Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1921) 275 F. 148; American Music Stores v. Kussell, (C.C.A.
6th, 1916) 232 F. 306; Bay Shore Investment.Co. v. Palmer, (D.C. Fla., 1922) 284
F. 979; Fidelity Fuel Co. v. Martin Howe Coal Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1926) 15 F. (2d)
470; Thompson-Starrett Co. v. La Belle Iron Works, (C.C.A. 2d, 1927) 17 F.
(2d) 536. Distinction should be made between the narrowing of judicial inquiry by
the courts under the "disputes" article and other types of cases where public policy is
stronger against limitation of resort to the courts. In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Eickhoff, 63 Minn. 170 at 178-179, 65 N.W. 351 {1895), Justice Mitchell said, "The
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to compliance, that determination by the Chief of Engineers was
enough. Chief Justice Taft said in his opinion for the Court:
"The cases leave no doubt that such a provision for termination of a contract is valid, unless there is an absence of .good faith
in the exercise of the judgment. . •. Such a stipulation may be a
harsh one or an unwise one, but it is valid and binding if entered
into. It is often illustrated in government contracts in which the
determination of a vital issue under the contract is left to the decision of a government officer." 88

Appeal Provisions
The "disputes" article provides for an administrative appeal to the
head of the government department or his designated representative.
The appeal by the contractor must be made in writing within thirty
days after a copy of the contracting officer's decision has been mailed
to him. The right of appeal belongs only Jo the contractor, and it is
not shared by the government. The decision by which the contractor
has agreed to be bound is certainly only a good faith decision. The
government has· the whip hand, and the courts expect that it will be
used fairly. 89 However, as to matters within the purview of the "disputes" article, the fact~that the contracting officer's decision breathes
of bad faith does not relieve the contractor of exhausting the procedures
specified within the contract prior to going into the courts.40 One of the
primary purposes of appeal is to meet the possibility that the contracting officer may have been at fault in some way. Another purpose of
the appeal provision is to assure the contractor of a fair hearing. The
right of a party to waive the protection of the law is subject to the control .of public
policy••.• Thus an agreement to waive the defense of usury is void.•.• The agreement
under consideration • • • provides that the plaintiff may, by his own ex parte acts,
conclusively establish and determine the existence of his own cause of action •••• The
case is not at all analogous to the common provisions in building and .construction contracts, by which the determination of some third person such as an architect or engineer,
as to the amount or character of the work, is made conclusive between the parties, in
the absence of fraud or mistake. . • • In the present case the attempt is to provide
that, after the alleged cause of action has accrued, the plaintiff shall be the sole and
exclusive judge. of both its existence and extent. Such an agreement is clearly against
public policy."
88
271 U.S. 536 at 548, 46 S. Ct. 613 (1926).
89 Mr. Justice Lamar said in Ripley v. United States, 223 U.S. 695 at 701-702,
32 S. Ct. 60 (1912), "But the very extent of the power and the conclusive character
of his decision raised a corresponding duty that the agent's judgment should be exercised-not capriciously or fraudulently, but reasonably and with due regard to the rights
of both the contracting parties."
40
United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 64 S. Ct. 820 (1944).
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mere fact that he is allowed to present his grievance to someone higher
up who will listen to him anew is some satisfaction to him, too, and in
this way the appeal provision has a psychological benefi.t.41
The appellate provisions in the article impose a duty on the contracting officer to make some decision when disputes. arise. He may
have a reasonable time in which to think the problem through, but an
unreasonable delay is beyond the contemplation of the parties and the
courts thereafter will entertain the contractor's suit. 42 The application
to the head of the department is appellate only.43 Until the contracting
officer has given his decision, the contractor has no determination from
which to appeal. 44 After unreasonable delay by the contracting officer
in deciding the case, the contractor's movement can be only to the
General Accounting Office or to the courts; or else he can lay his case
before Congress.
The same conclusion would seem to follow where the contracting
officer disclaims jurisdiction. He may believe erroneously that the particular subject is not for him, but for the Comptroller General. He
may make a ruling by which he declines jurisdiction and send the contractor to the General Accounting Office where the Comptroller General in turn rules that the contracting officer should have made the
det~rmination. Appeal may still be timely; but if more than thirty
days have elapsed since the contracting officer first refused to act, the
question will arise whether the original decision was a determinative
one. If it was, then it is too late now for the contractor to appeal and
the determination will have been conclusive. There is surely distinction, however, between a disclaimer of jurisdiction under the terms
. of the contract and a decision on the merits. Only the latter is determinative, and the contracting officer has made no determinative decision
within a reasonable time. The contractor has his remedy in court, for
it would be unfair if the government could direct its contractors down

a

41
See Smith, "The War Department Board of Contract Appeals," in 5 FED.
B. A. J. 74 (December 1943). Colonel Hugh Carnes Smith, U. S. Army, was until
recently president of the board to which his article refers.
42
Cape Ann Granite Co., Inc. v. United States, IOO Ct. Cl. 53 (1943); Cooper
v. United States, 8 Ct. Cl. 199 (1872).
43
Broderick & Gordon, B.C.A. No. 446, Jan. 31, 1944. There must be an
existing active contract, not, for instance, one terminated by payment in full which
has been accepted already. The Trinidad Bean & Elevator Co., B.C.A. No. 1083,
August 6, 1945; William Edward Kapp, B.C.A. No. 1088, August 6, 1945. Contra
if parties have not treated contract as closed. Jacob Siegel Co., B.C.A. No. 1037,
July 23, 1945.
44
Cape Ann Granite Co. v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 53 (1943); James McHugh Sons, Inc. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 414 (1943).
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blind alleys and then tell them on their return that it is too late now to
assert their claims.45
Is there a difference in substance, however, between leading contractors down blind alleys on the one hand and being so disagreeable
to them that th~y hesitate to appeal _within the executive department
for fear of retaliation? It is a breach on the part of the government to
prevent performance by the contractor, and, on principle, it seems that
the government may nc:>t affirmatively hinder the contractor's performance of a contract and that such hindrance would be a breach.46 Is this
conclusion that the government may not hinder the contractor's performance to be extended .still further to cover a case of non-cooperation
by the government? Is a government agent's disagreableness, moreover, to be treated as ~indrance by the government or only as failure
to cooperate? The United States Court of Claims gave judgment for a
claimant upon concluding that various unauthorized acts, rulings, and
instructions of a government superintendent were unreasonable and in
many instances arbitrary, capricious and suggestive of bad faith. That
court found that certain government officers had required the contractor
"to do things admittedly not required of him under the contract on
threat of reprisal for refusal." 47 The government appealed, however,
and the Supreme Court, in the case of United States v. Blair,48 reversed
45

Earle & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 494 (1944).
(Preventing performance) United States v. Peck, 102 U.S. 64 (1880); Lovell
v. St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Co., III U.S. 264, 4 S. Ct. 390 (1884); DuPont
de Nemours Powder Co. v. Scl.tlottman, (C.C.A. 2d, 1914) 218 F. 353. (Hindering
performance) CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT,§ 315(1) (1932). In Graybar Electric Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 232 at 246 (1940), the contractor was excused for
late performance due to breach by government in holding up payments to the contractor.
The Court of Claims said, " ••• a failure on the part of the one demanding performance to do that which it required of him . . . to enable the other party to perform
without hindrance or delay within the time limit operat~s as a waiver of the time provisions of the contract."
47 Blair v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 71 at 98 (1942), subsequently reversed on
·•
appeal, as appears hereafter.
,
, 48 321 U.S. 730, 64 S. Ct. 820 (1944).'· See also Myers v.- Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 (1938); Leebern v. United States,
(C.C.A. 5th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 505; Fitzgibbon v. United States, 52 Ct. Cl. 164
(1917); and Klepinger, "The Government Contract 'Dispute Clause' Pitfall," 48
Law Notes 19 (May-July 1944). In the Blair case, the government had awarded two
contracts related to the construction of certain buildings at Veterans' Administration
Facility at Roanoke, Virginia. A construction contract was given to Blair who was to
complete his work within 420 days after receiving notice to proceed. Concurrently,
a mechanical contract for plumbing, heating and electrical work was awarded to Redmon, who was to commence work promptly after being notified to proceed. Blair
could have completed his work in 314 days had Redmon done his part on time.
46
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the decision of the Court of Claim~ The "disputes" article in the contract provided a procedure for appeal which the contractor had not
followed. Having chosen not to follow his only avenµe of relief within
the thirty-day period provided in the contract, the contractor was held
to have relinquished any remedy for correcting the abuses. His failure
to appeal under the facts of this case was felt by the Supreme Court
to be without due cause.
On' the other hand, a contracting officer may be solicitous of the
contractor's interests and be so hesitant to offend the contractor's feelings that it may be difficult to ascertain from the language he uses
whether he is making a decision or merely expressing a tentative
opinion. The thirty-day appeal period does not begin to run until a
determinative ruling has been mailed to the contractor. However,
administrative practice does not require that the ruling be in any particular style or language. It is a sufficient definitive ruling, for instance,
that the contracting officer write the contractor in denial of his claim,
"It is the opinion of this office that full compensation under the terms
of the contract has been received by the contractor." 49 By like token,
a letter from an aggrieved contractor is sufficient to constitute a notice
of appeal if it is in such language as to lead the contracting officer and
appellate body to treat it as a notice. An extreme example of such
letter to. a contracting officer determined to be a sufficient notice of
appeal was one which read, ''We see no reason why we should have to
make an appeal to the Secretary of War for an adjustment which is
specifically contained in a Contract and Change Order which have been
formally and properly executed by both the Government and ourselves." 60
With language as in the latter case, it could easily be possible that
the contract~ng officet would treat the words, not as a notice of appeal,
but as a request to him to reconsider his decision. If he reconsiders it,

.

.

Redmon was unable to proceed, but the government delayed in terminating his contract
and in obtaining a new mechanical contractor. Blair was thus unable to finish his work
within 314 days, but he did complete it within the 420 days specified in the contract.
Held, he had no right of recovery. Said Mr. Justice Murphy, (at p. 734), "To
hold that he can exact damages from the Government for failing to cooperate fully
in changing the contract by shortening the time provisions would be to imply a
grossly unequal obligation. We cannot sanction such liability without more explicit
language in the contract." Suppose Blair had been unable to complete the work until
450 days. It would seem that the government would have been liable to him for 30
days delay on the ground of the government's hindrance.
49
Corson and Gruman Co., B.C.A. No. 316, Sept. 21, 1943.
60
Lehigh Portland Cement Co., B.C.A. No. 355, Jan. 22, 1944.
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the question arises whether the thirty-day appeal time runs anew from
the date of reconsideration or runs only from that of the original determination. Courts amend their findings on occasions. No reason is perceived why a contracting officer may not do so under some conditions.
If he should reverse a ruling after the contractor has acted upon it, the
government will be bound for any costs which the contractor has been
obliged to incur by reason of such reversal. 51
The right of a contractor to have a determinative ruling reconsidered raises the question as to his right to keep the appeal period alive
on his own initiative. Simply requesting reconsideration with or without good cause may not be used as a wedge, when on reconsideration
the claim is denied again, to start the appeal period running anew. 52
Suppose, however, that on request for reconsideration the contracting
officer should decide to reverse his original decision. More specifically,
assume that thirty days have passed and now he is asked to rule to the
detriment of the government. At the end of those thirty days, the
government had acquired a vested right. The contracting officer may
not waive it, for it is established that except as Congress has given him
such power, no agent of the government may waive a vested right
belonging to the government. 53 On the other hand, suppose the thirtyday appeal period has not run and the facts are such that if the contractor should appeal, the contracting officer feels certain' his original decision will be reversed. It would be wasteful to require the contractor,
who has been alert in the protection of his rights, to go to the trouble
and expense of taking an appeal. Here no vested rights of the government would be waiv~d, and the reconsideration to the detriment of the
51
Langevin v. United States, IOO Ct. CL 15 (1943); W. S. King & Co., Inc.
v. United States, 80 Ct. Cl. 325 (1934).
52
"To rule otherwise would permit one· party to extend this period indefinitely
by the simple expedient of addressing requests for reconsideration to the contracting
oflicer."-Paul E. Gritiin & Co., B.C.A. No. 475, April 22, 1944. See J. A. Terteling
& Sons, B.C.A. No. 396, Jan. 29, 1944. See H. R. H. Construction Corp., B.C.A.
No. 1058, July 30, 1945.
·
53 Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. -289, 61 S. Ct. 838 (1941);
Pacific Hardware & Steel Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 327 (1914); American
Sales Corp. v. lYnited States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 141; Goldschmidt &
Bethune Co., B.C.A. No. 886, Feb. 5, 1945; Hartwell Brothers, B.C.A. No. 517,
Feb. 29, 1944; Corson and Gruman Co., B.C.A. No. 316, Sept. 21, 1943; 17 Comp.
Gen. 3 54 ( l 93 6). In the event of appellant's failure to file an appeal within thirty
days from the adverse decision of the contracting officer, the board considers itself
powerless to take jurisdiction or to waive the delay. H. R. H. Construction Corp.,
B.C.A. No. 1058, July 30, 1945; Guy A. Thompson, Trustee, B.C.A. No. 1075,
July 18, 1945.
•
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government would be permissible. It has been held to be sufficient if
the request for reconsideration be transmitted within the thirty days.
The contracting officer should have time to think the matter through,
and his favorable reconsideration was said to have been properly made
even after the thirty days had run. 54
A liberal trend thus appears in the determination of the time a&er
which the claimant is precluded from appeal. The tendency is to avoid
causing forfeiture of rights merely for the failure of the contractor to
pursue technical procedures strictly. Where a contracting officer has
denied an extension of time for delivery on one ground, the contractor,
more than thirty days therea&er, was permitted to request such extension again on other grounds and appeal the latter decision. 55 Where a
ruling of the contracting officer was dated January 26, but the record
did not disclose the date when it was mailed, the contractor was given
the benefit of the reasonable doubt so that a letter of appeal dated
thirty-one days later was held to be timely.56 Subcontractors are not in
privity with the government and it is doubtful that they have rights
in their own names to proceed under "disputes" clauses in prime contracts with the government. 57 Major subcontracts do sometimes contain "disputes" articles providing for appeal. 58 In the absence of such
54
The original decision in such case would not be treated as a final determination.
Jacob Kleinman, B.C.A. No. 939, May 9, 1945.
55
Chessler, B.C.A. No. 451, Jan. 21, 1944.
56
Lehigh Portland Cement Co., B.C.A. No. 355, Jan. 22, 1944.
57
In a private contract between A and B, it was set forth that A would assume
all of B's obligations to C. C claimed the contract was for his benefit and could be
enforced by him. "That such is the general rule· can not be controverted. • . • [ Citation
of cases.] However, before such rule can be applicable in a given case, it must appear
that the agreement was made for the direct benefit of the third party, and not merely
incidentally for his benefit. : ·. • Each case must depend upon the intention of the
parties as that intention is to be gleaned from a consideration of all of the contract
and the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of its execution."-In re
A. C. Becken Co., (C.C.A., 7th, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 681 at 685. Where a prime
contractor with the government sues for damages sustained by both himself and a subcontractor, but the sub has absolved the prime of liability due to government delays,
the prime can recover only for his own loss; and the sub may not assign his claim to
the prime for purposes of suit. Severin v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435 (1943). Distinguish a subcontract not containing a "disputes" article from a supplemenetary agreement running between the prime and the government not containing such an article.
If the original agreement between the prime and the government <;ontains a "disputes"
article, it would seem that the same article should cover any supplementary agreements
between the government and the prime. Peterson & Co., B.C.A. No. 420, Jan. 13,
1944.
58
In such case it has been held administratively that the major subcontractor can
appeal only if the prime contract authorizes the major sub to appeal. General Motors
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"disputes" article within the subcontract and provision for it in the
prime contract, a subcontractor may find himself aggrieved by what
the contracting officer has decided. 59 One procedure would ·be for the
prime contractor to appeal for him. In another, the subcontractor is
permitted to appeal through the prime who adopts the subcontractor's
notice as his own. In at least one case of administrative practice, when
a subcontractor appealed through a prime contractor in reliance upon
the "disputes" article in the prime contract, it was concluded that the
date on which the subcontractor mailed his notice of appeal was the
date of .appeal and not the date the prime contractor mailed it on with
his approval. 60
The right of appeal is purely contractual. Where the contract contains no "disputes" article, no right of appeal exists and the claimant's
entire remedy is in the courts. 61 Where the contract does contain a
"disputes" article, an aggrieved contractor who bends to the side of
peaceful relationships will jeopardize his rights by cooperating with the
contracting officer without protest until the· period of appeal has
passed. 62 The contractor has a contractual right, moreover, to the independent decision of the designated contracting officer. He need not
accept a decision involving the exercise of judgment or discretion imposed upon that officer by some~ne of superior authority in his departCorp., B.C.A. No. 174, Sept. 24, .1943; Chrysler Corp., B.C.A. No. 39, 47, 48, 73,
and 79, May 25, 1943; United States ex rel. Chamberlain Metal Weatherstrip Co.,
Inc. v. Madsen Construction Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 139 F. (2d) 613.
59
Subcontracting has become an extremely necessary practice in government World
War II transactions. It is done under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts only with the consent of the contracting officer. The government in such case reserves the right to pay
the sub directly. It would seem that such contracts are made for the direct benefit of
subcontractors. See Nemmers, "The Problem of Government Liability to Subcontractors under Terminated CPFF Prime Contracts-The Third Party Beneficiary Theory,"
31 VA. L. REV. 161 (1944). It would seem less clear and yet not unpersuasive that,
where it is known that subcontracting will surely be done, subcontractors shall acquire
some rights as third party beneficiaries under even fixed price or lump sum prime contracts.
60
W. D. Peck & Co., Inc., B.C.A. No. 527, April 18, 1944.
61
Eugene Dietzgen Co., B.C.A. No. 445, Jan. 22, 1944.
62 "Plaintiff's willingness to cooperate was the occasion for his doing considerable
extra work which he would not have been required to do without additional compensation under the strict terms of his contract. Unfortunately, his failure to comply ,with
, the method set out in the contract for 'protecting his rights, and his failure to produce
reco_rds showing the amount of his damage make it impossible to allow him for such
items." McGlone v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 507 at 540 (1942). See also American
Brid~e Co. v. United States, (D.C. Pa. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 714.
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ment or by the General Accounting Office.63 The contracting officer
should certainly be able to give weight to precedent where a body of
administrative determinations has been established, but the exercise of
judgment in the case must, :finally, be his own. 64

•

War Department Board of Contract Appeals
On appeal, similarly, the contractor has a contractual right to the
independent determination of the person designated in the contract to
hear appeals. It will be observed in this connection that in the particular "disputes" article set forth above, the decision on appeal is to be
that of the Secretary of War or his designated representative. It is not
infrequent for heads of executive departments to hear such appeals
themselves, but the impossibility of the Secretary of War to hear them
personally during th~ press of war business is obvious. He tried designating the Assistant Secretary of War to act for him in some cases. The
assistant was obliged to tell an appealing contractor that "he didn't
have time to hear appeals, that he couldn't take the time to consider
these matters or pass judgment on them because he had too many
weighty things to do." Some junior officer in the Quartermaster Corps
assembled the data for the appeal, and this, the Assistant Secretary said,
would be the record upon which any decision would be made. It was
not even clear that he had looked at the record when he sustained the
contracting officer.. The contractor was left dissatisfied. The court entertained his suit on the ground that the contract had been breached. 65
The solution' within the War Department as a wartime measure
63
James McHugh Sons, Inc. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 414 (1943); KarnoSmith Co. v. United States, 84 Ct. CL uo (1936); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. v. United States, 76 Ct. CL 154 (1932).
64
Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. United States, 76 Ct. CL 154 (1932). In
Appeal of Ford Motor Co., B.C.A. No. 912, April 25, 1945, the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee
contract provided that in allowing costs to the contractor the government would be
guided by Treasury Decision 5000. That Treasury Decision provided among other
things a test for determining salaries for corporation officers.• From Headquarters, Army
Air Forces, Materiel Command, there was issued a regulation forbidding contracting
officers to allow such salaries in excess of $25,000 per year. The contracting officer
disallowed Ford claims for salaries in excess of that amount, and the company appealed.
The War Department Board of Contract Appeals set aside the ruling on the ground that
the contractor was entitled to the independent decision of the contracting officer. The
board said, "Of course, in a given case a contracting officer might decide that a $25,000
maximum salary was reasonable but salaries in excess of that amount can be deemed
reasonable in proper circumstances as has been decided by the War Department Board
of Contract Appeals."
65 The Penker Construction Co. v. United States, 96 Ct. CL 1 (1942).
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has been the creation of the War Department Board of Contract
Appeals in the Office of the Under Secretary of War. 66 Contract forms
were amended to make it clear that the board might act as the secretary's designated representative in matters of appeal. 67 Where the
board is not specified within the contract, its president acts as the representative. When a majority of the board cannot agree in cases where
the board is supposed to act, the Under Secret_ary of War will then
make the determination. When the president of the board acts as the
Secretary of War's designated representative, he considers the recom66
Constituted in the Office of the Under Secretary of War by memorandum of the
Secretary of War, dated August 8, 1942.. See War Department Procurement Regulations, PR 318-D through 318-F. 5.
61 PR 326 requires all War Department contracts of $20,000 or more, and authorizes such contracts in amounts less than $20,000, to contain the following articles without deviation:
"Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, all disputes concerning
questions of fact which may arise under this contract, and which are not disposed of
by mutual agreement, shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his
decision to writing and mail a copy thereof to the Contractor at his address shown
herein. Within 30 days from said mailing the Contractor may appeal in writing to the
Secretary of War, whose written decision or that of his designated representative or
representatives thereon shall be final and conclusive upon the parties hereto. The
Secretary of War may, in his discretion, designate an individual, or individuals, other
than the Contracting Officer, or a board as his authorized representative to determine
appeals under this Article. The Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard
and offer evidence in support of his appeal. The president of the board, from, time
to time, may divide the board into divisions of one or more members and assign members thereto. A majority of the members of the board or of a division thereof shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of the board or of a division,
respectively, and the decision of a majority of the members of the board or of a division
shall be deemed to be the decision of the board or of a division, as the case may be.
If a majority of the members of a division are unable to agree on a decision or if within
30 days after a decision by a division, the board or the president thereof directs that the
decision of the division be reviewed by the board, the decision will be so reviewed,
otherwise the decision of a majority of the members of a division shall become the
decision of the board. If a majority of the members of the board is unable to agree
upon a decision, the president will promptly submit the appeal to the Under Secretary
of War for his decision upon the record. A vacancy in the board or in any division
thereof shall not impair the powers, nor affect the duties of the board or division
nor of the remaining members of the board or division, respectively. Any member
of the board, or any examiner designated by the president of the board for that purpose,
may hold hearings, examine witnesses, receive evidence and rnport the evidence to the
board or to the appropriate division, if the case is pending before a division. Pending
decision of a dispute hereunder the Contractor shall diligently proceed with the performance of this contract. Any sum or sums allowed to the Contractor under the provision of this Article shall be paid by the United States as part of the cost of the articles or
work herein contracted for and shall be deemed to be within the contemplation of this
contract."
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mendation of the board. Should he disagree with the board's recommendation, the matter again is submitted to the Under Secretary of
War for his decision.68

What Questions May Be Determined Administratively
We have indicated how far the courts have gone in permitting
boards of arbitration and administrative officers under contracts requiring satisfactory performance to make final determinations of law and
fact so as to narrow the scope of judicial review. The same rules will
not always apply to the scope of administrative determinations under
"disputes" articles because of the way they are worded and in the light
of existing statutes, but generally they should be applicable. The rule
as to division of functions, often loosely stated in the trial of lawsuits,
has never been applied on any strict apportionment basis that all fact
questions go to the jury and all law questions are for the judge; and it
would also seem impractical to say that an administrative officer's functions must any the more be restricted to determination of fact questions
only. A judge determines numerous questions of fact preliminary to
the determination of questions of law, and the jury rules on legal
effects to be attached to various facts, 69 Under the Tucker Act, we
shall see that the Court of Claims has treated questions both of breach
and of the amount of unliquidated damages as law questions, to be
judicially determined, whereas they would ordinarily be determined by
a jury.in the trial of a lawsuit after it has been instructed in the law
by the judge. Moreover, the administrative officer in a government
contract case must make his entire determination without the benefit of
instructions from the court. Even under the narrow "disputes" article,
he should be allowed to make his own preliminary legal determinations 10 whereas in a lawsuit the judge would be available to make them
for the jury. if, in the government contract case, the court determines
that the government has breached its contract, it will, under the Tucker
68

PR 318-D.4 and 318-D.5.
See W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§ 2549-2559 (1940); Maguire and
Epstein, "Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility"of Evidence,"
40 HARV. L. REv. 392 (1927); Morgan, "Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact," 43 HARV. L. REv. 165 (1929); Stern,
"A Review-of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis,"
58 HARV. L. REV. 70 (1944).
70 " • • • the primary questions presented are questions of fact, and, therefore, the
appeal involves a mixed question of law and fact. Under such circumstances, this Board
has consistently held that the decisions of the contracting officer are appealable under
the simple disputes clause.•.." N. P. Severin Co., B.C.A. No. 124, May 27, 1944.
69

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

Act, disrega~d to a great extent any findings of fact that may have been
made by any administrative officer,11. except as it may conclude that they
show him to have made admissions by which the government should
be bound.72
There does not appear to be any constitutional barrier as to how far
Congress may go in these cases to oust the judiciary of its functions.
Congress created the Court of Claims to lessen the Congressional burden. The original act of r 855 limited that court generally to investigatory powers. It was known as "An Act to establish a Court for the
Investigation of Claims against the United States." 78 In 1863, for the
first time, the Court of Claims was authorized to 'render final judgments, and the new statute contained a provision not in the act today
"that no money shall be paid out of the treasury for any claim passed
upon by the court of claims till after an appropriation therefqr shall be
estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury."74, Today the.decision
of the court is looked upon as final, and from it one appeals directly
to the Supreme Court, although in fact an appropriation in some.form
is still prerequisite to payment. In short, the Court of Claims was originally an administrative or advisory_ body. It is still called upon by
Congress for advisory opiµions. While it is a judicial body now, it has
not the s~rt of judicial power contemplated by Article III, Section r,
of the Constitution. It is a legislative tribunal as distinguished from a
constitutional one.75 Perhaps one may say that it and the district courts
n Langevin v. United States, IOO Ct. CI. 15 (1943).
Irwin & Leighton v. United States, IOI Ct. CI. 455 (1944).

12

Act of Feb. 24, 1855, IO Stat. L. 612.
of March 3, I 863, I 2 Stat. L. 765 at 768, § 14. The judicial power of the
Court of Claims is derived from the Congressional authority provided by Art. I, Sec.
8, of the Constitution: " ••• to pay the debts ..• of the United States." United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 at 587, 61 S.Ct. 767 (1941). It is not an unconstitutional encroachment for Congress to recognize a moral claim to be legal and direct
the Court of Claims to render judgment accordingly, even though the Court of Claims
may have previously rejected the claim. Pope v. United States, IOO Ct. CI. 375 (1944).
15 Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 53 S. Ct. 751 (1933); Ex parte
Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438, 49 S. Ct. 4II (1929); U~ited States, for use of
Mutual Metal Mfg. Co. v. Biggs, (D.C. Ill. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 8. For the Court of
Claims' reaction to the Supreme Court's conception, see Pope v. United States, 100
Ct. CI. 375, hearing on petition for a retrial, 53 F. Supp. 570 (1944) and the comeback of the Supreme Court on certioI"ari at 323 U.S. I, 65 S. Ct. 16 (1944). Cf.
O'Donohue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S. Ct. 740 (1933) in which District
of Columbia courts were held to be constitutional courts under thtt protection of Art.
III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, The District of Columbia is a permanent territory of
the United States. Other territories are in the territorial status only temporarily, and
may subsequently be admitted to the union as states. Their courts are legislative courts.
13
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are performing a legislative function by a judicial process in government contract cases.
It would seem that the degree to which it is possible to deprive the
courts of jurisdiction by agreement in government contracts is substantially dependent upon statutory interpretation as to how much jurisdiction Congress intended the courts to have. Or, again, how much has
been left to the executive departments to determine disputes by the
administrative process? Then there is a question of construction of the
language in the "disputes" article itself. Of how much judicial protection does the article purport to deprive the contractor? If the claimant
feels aggrieved by the administrative determination under the "disputes" article, into how much may the courts inquire?
Gray v. Powell 1 6 dealt with a review in the courts of an administrative ruling under the Bituminous Coal Act of r937. Under that statute, a coal producer might obtain an exemption from an excise tax in
the event that he is also the consumer. A proceeding be.fore the National Bituminous Coal Commission, a statutory administrative body,
and "review" in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals is provided
by the statute. The act provides that "the finding of the Commission
as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."
In Gray v. Powell, Seaboard Airline Railway Company applied for an
exemption from the tax on the ground that it was both producer and
consumer. An order was issued by the director of the commission
against the company. After review, the Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the order of the director. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals and affirmed the director's order.
Mr. Justice Reed, in writing the majority opinion for the Supreme
Court, said:
·

"In a matter left specifically by Congress to the determination
of an administrative body, as the question of exemption was here
. . • , the function of review placed upon the courts by § 6 (b) is
fully performed when they determine that there has been a fair
hearing, with notice and an opportunity to present the circumstances and arguments to the decisive body, and an application of
the statute in a just and reasonable manner.... Congress, which
could have legislated specifically as to the individual exemptions
from the code, fou~d it more efficient to delegate that function to
those whose experience in a particular field gave promise of a
(Distinction between military commission and constitutional court) Ex parte Quirin,

317 U.S. 1, 63 s. Ct. 1, 2 (1942).
76
314 U.S. 402, 62 S. Ct. 326 (1941).
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better informed, more equitable, adjustment of the conflicting
interests of price stabilization upon the one hand and producer
consumption on the other..•. It is not the province of a court to
absorb the administrative functions to such an extent that the executive or legislative agencies become mere fact-finding bodies
deprived of_ the advantages of prompt and definite action." 77
Government attorneys argued to the Supreme Court only recently,
in the case of United States 'V. Beuttas,18 that the broad "disputes"
article permits final determinations of questions of law by the contracting officer, and that distinctions between questions of fact and those of
law are irrelevant to disputes under such an article. The Supreme Court
found it unnecessary to decide the question since it said the government
had committed no breach of contract anyway. In the event of breach,
the position taken by the Court of Claims, at least, is that the subject
of actual damages then to be imposed is one of law to be decided, not
under the "disputes" article, but judicially. Insofar as we are concerned
with whether only questions of fact, mixed questions of law and fact,
or even pure questions of law can be determined under "disputes"
articles, the Supreme Court has never explicitly drawn any distinction
between the categories. Distinctions that have been drawn by the Court
of Claims and the War Department Board of Contract Appeals incline
77

314 U.S. 402 at 4II-412, 62 S. Ct. 326 (1941).
(U.S. 1945) 65 S. Ct. 1000. The contract was for the construction of foundations for the Jane Addams Houses, a PWA project, in Chicago. It provided that designated classes of workmel_l be paid specified minimum wag~s, and that if the government should find it desirable to pay higher than that minimum it might establish
different rates and adjust the contract price accordingly. After the foundation work
was commenced, the government advertised for bids for construction of the superstruc,ture, and specified payment of higher minimum wages for the same categories of workmen than were required in the foundation work. Thereupon the foundation workmen
went on strike for wages in the same amount as on the superstructure. The foundation
contractor had to meet their demands in order to settle the strike. The contracting
officer made a decision under the "disputes" article that the contractor was not entitled
to reimbursement for the increased wages, and the Administrator of Public Works on
appeal sustained the contracting officer's ruling. The administrator was in error as to
some facts, but it is not suggested that he acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. The contractor then sued and the Court of Cla.ims allowed recovery on the ground that the
government had breached the foundation contract. [Beuttas v. United States, IOI
Ct. CI. 748 (1944) ]. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Claims
decision, Mr. Justice Roberts (at p. 1002) saying that the government had not "knowingly hindered respondents in the performance of the contract or culpably increased
their costs." Were the rule that the government must cooperate with its contractors,
it would seem sufficient to sustain liability that the governmen should have known the
effect its wage-fixing as to the superstr~cture would have had on foundation work
wages.
78
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toward the liberal side, except that the Court of Claims is definite that
pure questions of law may be finally determined only by the cou:rts.79
The rule seems to be that whether the "disputes" article in the government contract is the broad or narrow one, a decision on questions under
it will be held conclusive by the courts if "they relate to questions of
fact or questions' of law arising in connection with questions of fact." 80
Even this rule is not universally accurate, and reasonable minds
might well differ as to the propriety of the categories of law or fact into
which the courts have placed certain types of questions.81. It is established that questions of breach and unliquidated damages are in the
law category,82 and that questions of determining the amount of liquidated damages owed by the contractor to the government are in the
category of fact. 88 Where a government contract contains a "changes"
79
Beuttas v. United States, IOI Ct. Cl. 748 (1944), reversed on other grounds,
(U.S. 1945) 65 S. Ct. rnoo (1945); Needles v. United States, IOI Ct. Cl. 535
(1944); John McShain, Inc. v. United States, 97 Ct. CI. 281 (1942); Davis and
Fowler, Trustees v. United States, 82 Ct. CI. 334 (1936); United States v. Lundstrom,
(C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 139 F. (2d) 792; N. G. Petry, B.C.A. No. 499, Feb. 28, 1944;
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., B.C.A. No. 444, March 8, 1944.
so Opinion of The Judge Advocate General of the Army, SPJGC 161, May 17,
1942, I J.A.G. BuL. 36 (1942).
5
1. Thus one United States district court said the question as to whether the installation of steel shelving met specifications is one of fact for the contracting officer to
decide. General Steel Products Corp. v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 36 F.
Supp. 498. A Circuit Court of Appeals held that the question whether the contract
called for hauling "knocked down" sections of houses as distinguished from ordinary
lumber for a C.C. Camp was one of law determinable by the court. United States v.
Lundstrom, (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 139 F. (2d) 792.
82
After construing the broad disputes article as not allowing the question of breach
to be conclusively determined by an administrative officer, Judge Whitaker said for the
Court of Claims in Beuttas v. United States, IOI Ct. Cl. 748 at 769 (1944), "Such
an agreement would, be contrary to the Act of Congress giving its consent that the
United States might be sued .••• Not only is it beyond the power of a party to bargain
away this right given by Congress, but it must be borne in mind that bidders on this
work were forced to enter into this sort of an agreement." In the same case, at p. 772,
the concurring opinion of Judge Madden read in part, " ••. in practice, the contractor,
if he meant, by agreeing to Article I 5, to lodge in the contracting officer the power
to decide questions of breach of contract, has given that official power to decide cases
against him, but no power to decide cases, effectively, in his favor. No contractor in
his right mind would ever intend to do that. And no Government official, in drawing
a contract, would intend to include in it such an unconscionable provision." See Irwin
& Leighton v. United States, IOI Ct. Cl. 455 (1944); Coath & Goss, Inc. v. United
States, IOI Ct. Cl. 702 (1944); The Penker Construction Co. v. United States, 96
Ct. Cl. I (1942).
88
A classic case on this subject is Power v. United States, 18 Ct. CI. 263 (1883),
in which the court said, at p. 275; "An account is something which may be adjusted
and liquidated by an :irithmetical computation. One set of Treasury officers examine
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article 84 permitting the contracting officer to make structural changes in
the drawings arid specifications during the progress of the work, he
may hold up the work and take reasonable time out while he determines
exactly what changes he will order. The contractor; parenthetically,
will be allowed an equitable adjustment of his charges if the change
order puts him to additional expense. A delay for an unreasonable time
caused by the contracting officer is not contemplated by the "changes"
article. Should it occur, there will have been a breach which the courts
will review and with relation to which they will assess all damages,
liquidated or unliquidated.85 It is provided in the Tucker Act that the
and audit the accounts. Another set is intrusted with the power of reviewing that
examination, and with the further power of determining whether the laws authorize
the payment of the account when liquidated. But no law authorizes Treasury officials
to allow and pass in accounts a number not the result of arithmetical computation upon
a subject within tlie operation of the mutual part of a contract. Claims for unliquidated
damages require for their settlement the application of the qualities of judgment and
discretion. They are frequently, perhaps generally, sustained by extraneous proof•..•
The results to be reached in such cases can in no sense be called an account, and are
not committed by law·to the control and decision of Treasury accounting officers." See
William Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine Building Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 494,
30 S. Ct. 392 (1910); Plato v. United States, 86 Ct. Cl. 665 (1938); Pioneer Contract Co., Inc., B.C.A. No. 1016, May 17, 1945; Asbestos Wood Manufacturing Co.,
B.C.A. No. 386, Jan. 25, 1944; Olson Construction Co., B.C.A. No. 454, Feb. 22,
1944; A. S. Wikstrom, B.C.A. No. 98, March 24, 1943; Harry Boyer, Son & Co.,
B.C.A. No. 6, March 5, 1943.
84
A Changes article is followed by an Extras article. The following language is
frequently used for each:
"Changes.-The contracting officer may at any time, by a written order, and
without notice to the sureties, make changes in the drawings and/or specifications of
this contract and within the general scope thereof. If such changes cause an increase
or decrease in the amount due under this contract, or in the time required for its
performance, an equitable adjustment shall be made and the contract shall be modified
in writing accordingly. No change involving an estimated increase or decrease of more
than Five Hundred Dollars shall be ordered unless approved in writing by the head of
the department or his duly authorized representative. Any claim for adjustment under
this article must be asserted within IO days from the date the change is ordered:
Provided, however, That the contracting officer, if he determines that the facts justify
such action, may receive and consider, and with the approval of the head of the department or his duly authorized representative, adjust any such claim asserted at any time
prior to the date of final settlement of the contract. If the parties fail to agree upon
the adjustment to be made the dispute shall be determined as provided in article 15
hereof. But nothing provided in this article shall excuse the contractor from proceeding
with the prosecution of the work so changed."
"Extras.-Except as otherwise herein provided, no charge for any extra work or
material will be allowed unless the same has oeen ordered in writing by the contracting
officer and the price stated in such order."
85 Irwin & Leighton v. United States, IOI Ct. Cl. 455 (1944). Merely alleging
there is a breach by the government, too, cannot be used as a trick to get the court
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Court of Claims and district courts have jurisdiction in certain cases,
not sounding in tort, of "liquidated or unliquidated" damages. By
established practice, liquidated damages have long been settled within
the executive departments also, whereas unliquidated damages have
not been so settled. 86
In the language permitting equitable adjustment under the
"changes" article, one finds an analogy to words in section 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act by which the courts are authorized to make a determination that a proposed plan of business reorganization is "fair and
equitable." These words from the Bankruptcy Act have been treated
as words of art for a law determination; and yet equitable adjustment
has been treated as a decision of fact under the "changes" article. In
United States v. Callahan Walker Construction Company,81 the Supreme Court even treated the determination of profits as one of fact in
connection with a contract where the contractor was entitled to an
equitable adjustment for such simple items as the cost of .digging, moving, and placing earth, and, in addition, a reasonable arid customary
allowance for profit.
'
It would seem that the profits to be allowed in such case are in the
nature of unliquidated damages to be charged against the government.
On this theory, their determination is one of law. As alternative explanations of the Supreme Court's position it might be said, either that
the determination of profits was treated as fact here because they were
so simple to determine in this particular case, or that the decision
denotes a willingness to hold all items of profit, simple or complex, to
be a subject for administrative determination. A further explanation
might be suggested, however, that a change order is in the nature of
an amendment to the original contract or of some agreement supplementary thereto. According to the language of the Court in United States
v. Corliss Steam Engine Company, 88 a leading case in the termination
to assess the liquidated damages owed by the contractor. The government's breach must
have been actual. American Engineering Co. v. United States, (D.C. Pa. 1938) 24
F. Supp 449.
86
Globe Indemnity Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 476, 54 S. Ct. 499 (1934).
87
317 U.S. 56, 63 S. Ct. II3 (1942). See also as related cases Securities and
Exchange Commission v. United States Realty and Improvement Co., 3 IO U.S. 434,
60 S. Ct. 1044 (1940); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106,
60 S. Ct. 1 (1939); L. E. Myers Co. v. United States, IOI Ct. Cl. 41 (1944); Silberblatt & Lasker, Inc. v. United States, IOI Ct. Cl. 54 (1944); R. C. Huffman Construction Co. v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. So (1943); San Ore Construction Co.,
B.C.A. No. 352, Jan. 29, 1944.
88
ln this case, 91 U.S. 321 at 322-323 (1875), Mr. Justice Field, referring to
termination by the contracting officer, said, "As, in making the original contracts, he

MrcHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 44

of shipbuilding contracts made during the Civil War, this is significant. If the change order is to be treated simply as an amendment
to the contract, the equitable adjustment would not be by way of
determining damages at all.' The contracting officer had latitude in
entering int9 the original agreement. During performance, he could
make further incidental agreements for the benefit of the government
in improving or modifying or amending or terminating the original
plans, so long as the contract is an active one.
By a variation in the facts involving the "changes" article, dispute
might arise between the parties as to whether what the contracting
officer orders is a change or whether it is an item which the contractor
is obliged to perform under the contract. Here the common provision
previously referred to in this article, that the contracting officer shall
be the interpreter of drawings and specifications, becomes important.
This makes him the interpreter of the contract itself in some respects,
and as such, his decision becomes a law determination. 89 These provisions have been upheld. Occasionally they are referred to by courts as
calling for fact rulings. 90 This is not a very satisfactory explanation,
and the better reasons for leaving this category of determinations to
administrative officers would appear to be historic and practical. It has
long been recognized as desirable to keep work moving along by having
decisions on certain disputes made promptly on the spot where the work
'
must agree upon the compensation to be made for their entire performance, it would
seem, that, when those contracts are suspended by him, he must be equally authorized
to agree upon the compensation for their partial performance. Contracts for the armament
and equipment of vessels of war may, and, generally do, require numerous modifications
in the progress of the work, where that work requires years for its completion. With
the improvements constantly made in ship-building and steam-machinery and in arms,
some parts originally contracted for may have to be abandoned, and other parts substituted; and it would be of serious detriment to the public service if the power of the
head of the Navy Department did not extend to providing for all such possible contingencies by modification or suspension of the contracts, and settlement with the contractors."
89 "It is the duty of the court to construe written instruments; but the application
of their provisions to external objects described therein is the peculiar province of the
jury." Richardson v. The City of Boston, 60 U.S. 263 at 270 (1856). See also Davis
and Fowler, Trustees v. United States, 82 Ct. CI. 334 (1936); Phoenix Tempe Stone
Co. v. De Waard, (C.C.A. 9th, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 757; Green v. Foundation Co.,
44 N.Y.S. {2d) 547 (1943); Fred A. M. de Groot, Inc., B.C.A. No. 108, June 8,
1943. (Some substantial support for the interpretation) King v. United States, 100 Ct.
CI. 475 (1944). (No reasonable basis for the ruling) Bein v. United States, 101 Ct.
CI. 144 (1943).
90
"We are of opinion that they [the government] intended to demand only that
the contracting officer should decide questions of fact arising as the work progressed,
such as the proper interpretation of the requirements of the contract documents.•••"
Beuttas v. United States, IOI Ct. Cl. 748 at 770 (1944).
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is performed. Designated administrative officers are usually technical
experts in their fields, and are able to arrive at conclusions related to
drawings and specifications more correctly than the average court could
do. There is some analogy here to the persuasive value of expert testimony in the trial of lawsuits.
Frequently, but not always, these articles specify that the interpretations by the officer on the job shall be final. Where they do so specify,
the aggrieved contractor may not appeal under the "disputes" article
by its very language, and his only relief in court will be for fraud,
arbitrariness, or bad faith of the administrative officer. Where the contract says nothing about the finality of the contracting officer's interpretation, however, the right of the contractor to appeal to the head of
the executive department or his designated representative will depend
upon the language of the "disputes" article itself.91 If the "disputes"
article is limited by its terms to fact questions, since interpretation is a
law determination, n·o appeal may be made from it. When, however,
it has been necessary to interpret the terms of the contract and the
provisions of the specifications incidental to determining fact disputes,
the War Department Board of Contract Appeals has treated the primary questions as those of fact, to which interpretation is secondary,
and the appeal as involv-ing mixed questions of law and fact and proper
under even the simple -"disputes" clause.92
Under the First War Powers Act
In an effort to rush along the war procurement program during
World War II, .Congress authorized the President to give authority
to any department or agency of the government exercising war functions "to enter into contracts and into amendments or modifications of
contracts . . . without regard to the provisions of law relating to the
making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts whenever he deems such action would facilitate the prosecution of the
war." 98 By Executive Order No. 9001,94 the ~resident delegated such
91

Merrill-Ruckgaber Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 387, 36 S. Ct. 662 (1916);
Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hensey, 205 U.S. 298, 27 S. Ct. 543 (1907); Comb Co.
v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 259 (1943); Fleisher Engineering & Construction Co.
v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 139 (1943); English Construction Co. v. United States,
(D.C. Del. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 313. So with the right to appeal from an attempted
administrative determination of unliquidated damages. Asbestos Wood Manufacturing
Co., B.C.A. No. 386,. January 25, 1944.
92
The Owens Construction Co., B.C.A. No. 520, March 29, 1944; W. D. Peck
& Co., Inc., B.C.A. No. 527, April 18, 1944; McClure, B.C.A. No. 10, March 16,
1943. See Opinion of The Judge Advocate General of the Army, SPJGC 1943/28u,
Feb. 13, 1943, 2 J.A.G. BuL. 69, § 726 (41).
98
55 Stat. L. 839, § 201 (1941), 50 U.S.C. (1940), Supp. IV, App.,§ 601.
94
Exec. Order 9001, Dec. 29, 1941, 6 FED. REG. 6787 (Dec. 30, 1941), as
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authority to the War Department, Navy Department and the United
States Maritime Commission. By a series of further delegations, contracting officers within the War Department were given such authority
under the First War Powers Act that they can rule finally against
contractors under a "diputes" article and thereafter by supplemental
agreement amend the contract to give the contractor what lie feels
should have been conceded to him anyway, provided it is first administratively determined that to do so would facilitate the prosecution
of the war. In this way, the contracting officer may overcome legal
obstacles to justice by means of a supplementary agreement to allow
the war contractor to have ,that to which it seems he should properly
have been entitled in the first place. In cases where he has not shown
himself ready to do so under War Department contracts, the Board
of Contract Appeals adopted a recommendation of The Judge Advocate
General of the Army that, after making its decisions on appeal, it
proceed to express opinions as to the law and justice in the case and
make further-recommendations for the contracting officer's guidance.95
This board so won the confidence of both businessmen and the government that the Secretary of War by memorandum dated July 4, I 944
directed it to exercise :J,ll the delegable authority the Secretary of War
himself "might exercise either through contractual power or otherwise" in di;posing of appeals in order to arrive at the just disposition
of the dispute involved in the appeal. 96

Recommended Legislation
- Broad powers thus given to administrative officers necessarily reduce judicial inquiry in the courts. It has been argued that resort to
the courts would not be robbed of utility in proper cases if the "disputes" article could be made to cover, at all times, all questions,
whether of law or fact, since the administrative decision may be dis- regarded by the courts if it is arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or so
grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith. The scope of a court's authority cannot be reduced materially, however, without at the same time
amended by Exec. Order 9296, Jan. 30, 1943, 8 FED. REG. 1429 (Feb. 3, 1943).
On relief under the First War Powers Act and Exec. Order 9001, see Kramer, "Extraordinary Relief for War Contractors," 93 Umv. PA. L. REv. 357 (1945).
95
JAG Opinion SPJGC 1943/2811, Feb. 13, 1943, 2 J.A.G. BuL. 69, § 726
(41); Line Construction Co., Inc., B.C.A. No. 267, Jan. 14, 1944; Dawson Engineering Co., B.C.A. No. 513, April 5, 1944. From that point on the War Department
Board of Contract Appeals proceeded to consider and administratively pass upon appeals
whether or not based upon issues made appealable by the terms of the contract. John
E. Bennett Co., B.C.A. No. 26, Feb. 16, 1943.
,
96
War Department Procurement-Regulations, PR 318-D.7.
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affecting its dignity adversely. The Court of Claims is a specialized
court dealing, in large part, with government contract law questions;
if it is ousted from the function of deciding such questions one of the
major functions which that court has long exercised will have disappeared. At least the Court of Claims insists that it may not be ousted
of the function of deciding pure law questions by such provisions in
a government contract, which, that court has pointed out, the contractor has no other alternative than to acquiesce in if he wants to get the
government business. Congress gave that court and the district courts
jurisdiction to determine claims under government contracts. In Gray
v. Powell, the authority of the administrative officer had been given
by statute. In government contract cases, the authority of the contracting officers is limited by what Congress authorized them to do. They
have no power to make contracts except as Congress has authorized
them to do so. At least, Congress has never expressly authorized the
use of provisions in contracts to oust the courts of the jurisdiction the
Tucker Act has given to them. Moreover, the language used in the
"disputes" articles is the workmanship of the government executive
departments and is to be construed most strongly against the person
using it. Thus, it is persuasive to argue that the articles should not be
so construed as to deprive the contractor of resort to the courts on
pure questions of law unless the language used in the article clearly
requires such construction.
Meanwhile, during the pressure of the war emergency, the administrative method has been used for the settlement of disputes under
government war contracts with an efficiency which it is doubtful if
courts could have achieved; and this has been accomplished without
sacrifice of fairness to contractors. Members of the War Department
Board of Contract Appeals, all members of the Army and acting as
representatives of the government, give their full time to this specialized field of contract problems. If the use of "disputes" articles is to
be continued, experiences in this field during the war should not be
lost sight of, and jurisdictional lines between the administrative officers,
the General Accounting Office and the courts under the Tucker Act
should be clarified by statute. Heads of executive .departments are
busy with other matters and the determination of contract disputes calls
for a specialized treatment. It is desirable to build an administrtaive
body of decisions that may be common to all of the contracting agencies. Instead of providing for appeals to the heads of the departments,
it would seem more sensible to provide by an act of Congress for the
appointment of a central contract appeal board, like that used during
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the war in the War Department, to hear appeals under contracts made
by any department of the government.
There should be some opportunity for the contracting agencies to
experiment in methods of administrative settlement of disputes ~o
ascertain by what procedure the fairest results can be obtained for both
sides, and, at the same time, by what procedure the greatest confidence
of business in government transactions may be assured. To this end,
Congress should authorize settlement of government contract controversies by arbitration as well as . by the present standard "disputes"
article. Arbitration surely should not be looked upon here as a means
for experimentation for government's own purposes alone. The public
should be carefully guarded in all governmental transactions to assure
that a good bargain is made, in a competitive market whenever feasible,
in the case of every purchase by public money; and there is no reason
for departing from the concept that he who deals with the government
must be alert to turn square corners in his dealings. But why expect
·a contractor to be at a greater disadvantage in the determination of
disputes arising honestly between himself and the government than he
would be if the dispute were with a private contractor? or to be bound
by what Chief Justice Taft referred to, in Goltra v. Weeks, as a harsh
or unwise stipulation if it appears that it is such under existing facts? ·
Arbitration provides a speedy method for determining controversies
which purports to place both parties to the contract on an equally favorable footing. Its availability should be encouraged as a matter of right
to either party if that method seems fairer under specific circumstances
as they arise than the unilateral administrative method-provided by the
present standard "disputes" article would be.
Finally,,there is no justification for a contest between the administrative agencies and the courts on the basis that a number of the heads
of departments acting individually can dispose of appeals faster than
the one Court of Claims can try cases with such help as that court gets
from the district courts in smaller controversies. The problem is essen- ·
tially one, not of speed, but, again, of accomplishing fairness and justice and at the same time protecting the public intere$t, If the Court
of Claims has more business than it can handle with reasonable celerity,
the solution would be better not to reduce the protection the contractor
may receive. from the court, but either to provide more judges for that
court so it can be divided up into sections for trying cases, or to increase
the jurisdictional ~mounts of the government contract cases which.the
various district courts may handle.
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